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ABSTRACT
This essay advocates locating the foundation of the constitutional
right to an abortion in the Ninth Amendment. Using the Ninth Amendment
to recognize the right to an abortion, this article argues, is a better path
than using the Fourteenth Amendment because it takes the determination
of whether an abortion is a protected right outside the moral realm. The
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment of whether a right is “deeply
rooted in the tradition” of the United States inevitably stirs a debate about
whether the public considers abortion morally acceptable. In recognizing
the right to an abortion under the Ninth Amendment, no such analysis is
necessary. The text of the Ninth Amendment allows the U.S. Supreme
Court to recognize this protected right without an inquiry into historical
tradition. Instead, the Court can use natural law principles, as
contemplated by the Founders, to recognize that private conduct is worthy
of constitutional protection and acknowledge that the Ninth Amendment
affords these rights to the people.
The Ninth Amendment states that “the enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.” 1 This provision of the Constitution
recognizes that citizens of the United States have rights that are not
expressly contemplated in the text of the Constitution. 2 The Supreme
Court has acknowledged this concept throughout its history, most notably
in its recognition of a right to privacy that encompasses fundamental and
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other protected rights such as childrearing, procreation, contraception, and
abortion. 3 In doing so, however, the Court has usually found that these
unenumerated rights are protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, not “retained by the people” under the Ninth
Amendment. 4
Despite the fact that the Ninth Amendment gives courts the authority
to recognize unenumerated fundamental rights, the Court has been
reluctant to use, analyze, or even acknowledge the Ninth Amendment and
its implications.5 The landmark case discussing the Ninth Amendment is
Griswold v. Connecticut, where Justice Arthur Goldberg argued in his
concurring opinion that the Ninth Amendment housed a free-standing
right of privacy encompassing the right of married couples to use
contraception. 6 Since Griswold, the Court has mentioned the Ninth
Amendment on approximately twenty occasions, but has not addressed
the amendment in depth nor decided any case exclusively on Ninth
Amendment grounds. 7
Eight years after Griswold, the Court established the right to choose
an abortion, perhaps the most controversial protected right, in Roe v.
Wade. 8 In Roe, and nineteen years later in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held that the right to an
abortion was protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 In these foundational cases, and in other abortion-related
cases since Casey, the Court has consistently held that the right to privacy,
and therefore the right to an abortion, is housed within the Fourteenth
Amendment. 10 Despite the Ninth Amendment’s express guarantee that
there are unenumerated fundamental and other protected rights “retained
by the people,” the Court has chosen to engage in the cumbersome

3. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Name of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
4. See, e.g., cases cited in note 3.
5. See Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND.
L.J. 759, 764-69 (1994). Sanders discusses how the Court spent little time discussing the Ninth
Amendment before Griswold and says that “[t]he judiciary’s treatment of the Ninth Amendment
divides neatly into two eras:” before and after the Griswold decision.
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
7. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769–70.
8. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. Id. at 166; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–
47 (1992).
10. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–47.
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analysis required to recognize fundamental and other protected rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment time and time again. 11 The Court has
used this Fourteenth Amendment analysis to recognize not only the
abortion right, but all rights related to private conduct found worthy of
heightened constitutional protection. 12
While the analysis the Court uses to determine whether a right should
be considered a protected right under the Due Process Clause is not
without merit, housing the abortion right within the Fourteenth
Amendment unnecessarily complicates abortion jurisprudence. Indeed,
the Court already has the express authority to recognize unenumerated
rights under the Ninth Amendment, including abortion. 13 The recognition
of the right to an abortion is consistent with other unenumerated rights the
Court has recognized, from the use of contraception to the right to
procreation. 14
Using the Ninth Amendment to recognize the right to an abortion is
a better path than using the Fourteenth Amendment because it takes the
determination of whether an abortion is a protected right outside the moral
realm. 15 The analysis of whether a right is “deeply rooted in the tradition”
of the United States inevitably stirs a debate about whether the public
considers abortion morally acceptable. 16 In recognizing the right to an
11. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Name of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
12. See, e.g., cases cited in note 11.
13. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 764–69.
14. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). While the right to an abortion
has generally been considered the most important of a wide array of rights related to sex and
protection, some argue that abortion is sui generis in that it takes the life of another and therefore
involves another set of rights outside those of the mother. The argument generally is that because
abortion “involves the purposeful termination of a potential life,” the abortion decision “must
therefore be recognized as sui generis, different in kind from the others that the Court has protected
under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy.” See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
325 (1980); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 792 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). For these reasons, those opposing abortion argue that while
either the Fourteenth or Ninth Amendments may allow for the recognition of unenumerated
fundamental rights, abortion should not be one of those rights because it deals with the taking of life.
15. See Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining
Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 169, 189–90
(2003) (“The substantive due process doctrine’s lack of textual constitutional support persuades
judges to limit the scope of rights granted under it. Conservative jurists ascribed to this ironic rightslimiting view of the rights-expanding substantive due process doctrine as a mechanism for identifying
and protecting only those rights or liberties that have a firm foundation in the murky legal, historical,
moral or ethical tradition of Britain or the United States.”).
16. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (stating that the Due Process
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abortion under the Ninth Amendment, no such analysis is necessary. 17
The text of the Ninth Amendment allows the Court to recognize this
protected right without an inquiry into whether it is “deeply rooted in
historical tradition.” 18 Instead, the Court can use natural law principles, as
contemplated by the Founders, to recognize that private conduct is worthy
of constitutional protection and acknowledge that the Ninth Amendment
affords these rights to the people. 19
Part I of this Essay discusses the ratification of the Ninth Amendment
and its subsequent jurisprudential history, as well as different interpretive
theories scholars use to dissect the Ninth Amendment.20 Part II of this
Comment discusses the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence under the
Substantive Due Process Clause and the Ninth Amendment. 21 Part III of
this Essay analyzes the Court’s decision to house the abortion right under
the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Ninth Amendment and argues
that this decision was an erroneous overcomplication of abortion
jurisprudence. 22 The Essay concludes by affirming the Court’s need to reevaluate its abortion and privacy jurisprudence using the Ninth
Amendment.
I. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND ITS JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY
When the Founders drafted the Ninth Amendment, it was considered
an important compromise that allowed for the ratification of the Bill of
Rights. 23 Since then, however, courts have afforded the Ninth
Amendment little attention.24 Until the Supreme Court decided Griswold
v. Connecticut in 1965, it only mentioned the Ninth Amendment on rare
occasions. 25 Since Griswold, the Court has given the Ninth Amendment

Clause affords only those protections “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.”). See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (stating that the Court’s
jurisprudence reflects “continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society”).
17. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 170.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 764–65.
24. See id. at 769.
25. See id.
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only slightly more attention. 26 Legal scholars, on the other hand, are
starting to explore how best to interpret the Ninth Amendment. 27
A.

The Ratification of the Ninth Amendment

The text of the Ninth Amendment reads: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.” 28 This amendment and the rest of the Bill
of Rights were the result of vigorous debate among the Constitutional
Founders about whether enumerating certain rights within the
Constitution was necessary to protect citizens’ “unalienable” rights. 29 The
Founders, many of whom were disciples of John Locke, believed that men
were born into a “perfect state of freedom” but divested themselves of
certain rights by forming government and entering into the “social
compact” for the greater good of humanity. 30 In forming this social
compact, the Founders believed that men only forfeited those rights
necessary for effective government. 31
The debate over whether to include a Bill of Rights in the
Constitution, including the Ninth Amendment, occurred against this
backdrop. 32 While proponents of the Bill of Rights argued that omitting
an enumerated Bill of Rights would fail to protect people’s freedoms from
the newly formed federal government, Federalists responded with two
points. 33 First, Federalists argued that Article I limited the federal
government’s powers to those enumerated in the Constitution. 34 Based on

26. See id.
27. See, e.g., id.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
29. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 764–65.
30. See id. at 765; see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (1764) (C.B.
Macpherson ed., rev. ed. 1980). Locke theorized that all people were equal in the sense that they were
born with certain “unalienable” rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and property. Accordingly,
Locke said that citizens created governments to better enforce the natural rights that “no one ought to
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” See id. The protection of these rights required
men to voluntarily enter into a “social compact” to give up certain natural rights in order to protect
others. Id. For those reasons, some scholars theorize that the Founders felt that the “natural rights”
as discussed by Locke were the ones that were most deserving of Ninth Amendment protection. See
id. Indeed, “Alexander Hamilton indicated similar beliefs: ‘The sacred rights of mankind are not to
be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam, in
the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself; and can never be erased or
obscured by mortal power.’” See Sanders, supra note 5, at 802.
31. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 764–65.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
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Article I, Congress could only take action that the Constitution expressly
authorized, which did not include interfering with man’s natural rights. 35
Second, Federalists argued that a Bill of Rights, which would inevitably
be imperfect, would forfeit those rights not enumerated within it. 36 For
this reason, some felt that the enumeration of rights would be dangerous.37
The Ninth Amendment was the product of this debate. 38 Two years
after the ratification of the original Constitution, the states ratified a Bill
of Rights that included the Ninth Amendment, which expressly stated that
citizens had other rights not enumerated in the Constitution. 39 This
language was the compromise that satisfied both Federalists and AntiFederalists and allowed for the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791.40
B.

The Court’s Interpretation of the Ninth Amendment

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Ninth Amendment can be
divided into two distinct eras: the time period before Griswold v.
Connecticut and the time period after Griswold. 41 Up until 1965, the Court
discussed the Ninth Amendment in fewer than ten cases. 42 After Justice
Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold, the Ninth Amendment got
more attention than it ever had before.43 However, the Court still appears
to be reluctant to interpret the Ninth Amendment. 44

35. See id. at 765. Alexander Hamilton expressed this view when he asked, “[W]hy declare
that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that
the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed?” THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513–14.
36. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 765. Famed Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry, in arguing that a
Bill of Rights was essential to ordered liberty, said: “[Y]ou have a bill of rights to defend you against
the state government, which is bereaved of all power, and yet you have none against Congress, though
in full and exclusive possession of all power.” Id. Conversely, Federalists argued that an enumeration
of “exceptions to powers which [were] not granted . . . would afford a colorable pretext to claim more
than were granted.” Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.at 769.
39. See id. at 768–69.
40. See id. at 769.
41. See id. (“Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in the famous Griswold v. Connecticut
decision of 1965 marks the turning point from what may be called the B.C. era to, correspondingly,
the A.D. era. In the B.C. (Before the Concurrence) era, the Ninth Amendment hid like a neglected
child among its more popular sibling amendments in the Bill of Rights.”).
42. See id.
43. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769.
44. See id. at 770.
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1. Before Griswold v. Connecticut
Prior to Griswold, the Court spent almost no time examining the
Ninth Amendment. 45 The Court made only a handful of references to the
amendment, and those references were all brief and relatively
superficial. 46 The only instance where the Court dedicated considerable
space to discussion of the Ninth Amendment prior to Griswold was in
United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, where the Court discussed
the breadth of the Ninth Amendment as it related to political speech
afforded to federal government employees. 47
In Mitchell, the United Public Workers challenged certain provisions
of the Hatch Act, which made it unlawful for federal employees to engage
in certain political activities. 48 The workers claimed the Act violated their
Ninth Amendment rights because it interfered with their rights to act as a
leader or member of a political party in furtherance of their own respective
political views. 49 In rejecting the United Public Worker’s constitutional
challenge, the Court said:
The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government
are subtracted from the totality of sovereignty originally in the states and
the people. Therefore, when objection is made that the exercise of a
federal power infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted power
under which the action of the Union was taken. If granted power is found,
necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, must fail. 50
Despite these explicit mentions of the Ninth Amendment, the Court
declined to discuss how these rights fit within the Ninth Amendment or
what an intrusion upon Ninth Amendment rights may look like. 51 Instead,
the Court essentially equated the protections afforded by the Ninth
Amendment with those afforded by the Tenth and did not inquire into the
scope of its constitutional protection or other rights it may have
encompassed. 52 After Mitchell, the Court was essentially silent about the
45. See id. at 769. Before Griswold, the Court briefly mentioned the Ninth Amendment in
fewer than ten cases. Id.
46. See id.
47. See United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
48. Id. at 75–76.
49. Id. at 94 (“The right claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act as a
party official or worker to further his own political views.”).
50. Id. at 95–96.
51. See id.
52. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 770 (“Justice Reed obviously considered the Ninth
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Ninth Amendment until 1965, when it handed down its opinion in
Griswold. 53
2. Justice Goldberg’s Concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court was faced with determining
the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that prohibited citizens from
using contraceptives. 54 The Court struck down the statute as
unconstitutional based on a “right of privacy” that was found not
explicitly within the Bill of Rights, but within its “penumbras.” 55 The
Court said that these penumbras created certain “zones of privacy” the
government could not enter. 56 Accordingly, it held that the statute was
unconstitutional because it intruded on citizens’ right of privacy. 57 The
Court went on to discuss how it had previously recognized other
unenumerated rights, such as childrearing and educating children that had
undertones of rights enumerated in the Constitution. 58 It felt that the right
to privacy was no different than these other rights. 59
Justice Goldberg concurred in the judgment but declined to find that
the right to use contraception was protected on Fourteenth Amendment or

Amendment to be no more than an echo of the Tenth. The Ninth Amendment’s guarantee, whatever
it was, was not offended if Congress had acted pursuant to a delegated power. Thus, the Court’s first
reading of the Ninth Amendment not only failed to undertake, but largely precluded, an inquiry into
its central mysteries—the nature of, and the extent of constitutional protection for, the other rights
‘retained by the people.’”).
53. See id.
54. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (noting that the state statutes
provided that: “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days
nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned,” and that “[a]ny person who assists, abets,
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished
as if he were the principal offender.’”).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy.”).
57. See id. (“The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is
one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in
any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment.”).
58. See id. at 481–82.
59. See id.
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Bill of Rights penumbral grounds. 60 Instead, he held that the right to
privacy, and therefore the right to use contraception free from government
interference, was found in the Ninth Amendment. 61 Like the majority,
Justice Goldberg felt that the concept of liberty included more than what
was enumerated within the Constitution. 62 Goldberg, however, felt that
the Ninth Amendment was the appropriate home for the right of privacy
because it expressly acknowledged that citizens have rights not
contemplated by the Constitution. 63 In acknowledging that the right to
privacy within the marital relationship was fundamental, Goldberg stated
that while privacy was not expressly mentioned in the Constitution,
denying these types of relationships constitutional protection would
produce an absurd result. 64 In Goldberg’s view, this right was one of those
rights “retained by the people” under the Ninth Amendment. 65
While Goldberg believed that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
protected rights not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, he felt that
the language and history of the Ninth Amendment lent strong support to
the idea that citizens had fundamental rights other than those listed in the
first eight amendments. 66 In arguing so, he said:
While the Ninth Amendment—and indeed, the entire Bill of Rights—
originally concerned restrictions upon federal power, the subsequently
enacted Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States as well from
abridging fundamental personal liberties. And, the Ninth Amendment,
in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically mentioned in the
first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the existence of

60. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. Goldberg concluded that “the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the
view that the ‘liberty’ protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the
Federal Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
amendments.” Id.
64. See id. at 495–96.
65. See id. (“The fact that no particular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State
from disrupting the traditional relation of the family—a relation as old and as fundamental as our
entire civilization—surely does not show that the Government was meant to have the power to do so.
Rather, as the Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as
this one, which are protected from abridgment by the Government though not specifically mentioned
in the Constitution.”).
66. See id. at 493 (“The Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view that the
‘liberty’ protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the federal
government or the states is not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
amendments.”).
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other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as
federal, infringement. 67

From Goldberg’s perspective, the Founders intended for the Ninth
Amendment to protect citizens from government overreach and to ensure
that they retained other “natural rights” not enumerated in the
Constitution. 68
Some have criticized the Griswold Court for employing tenuous
reasoning to find privacy as a right protected by the penumbras of the Bill
of Rights. 69 According to one scholar, the Court’s majority opinion in
Griswold was “an indefensible leap in reasoning” that “pushed the Court
to make a methodical change in textual interpretation.” 70 Furthermore,
others have suggested that Justice Goldberg was unable to secure a
majority using this reasoning because he used an interpretation of the
Constitution that harkened back to the Founders’ original intent in drafting
the Ninth Amendment. 71 In avoiding applying Goldberg’s “original
intent” reasoning, some argue that the Court fell back on amorphous
language that allowed it to use its own judgment to pinpoint what rights
were worthy of constitutional protection. 72
Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold was the first time a Justice used
the Ninth Amendment to recognize a fundamental or otherwise-protected
right not enumerated in the Constitution, and the first opinion that
discussed the Ninth Amendment in detail. 73 Since then, the Court has
mentioned the Ninth Amendment approximately twenty times, but its
references continue to be trivial, and the Court has not decided any
decisions solely on Ninth Amendment grounds. 74 Overall, the Court still
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Derek Alexander Pope, A Constitutional Window to Interpretive Reason: Or, in Other
Words . . . the Ninth Amendment, 37 HOW. L.J. 441, 443 (1994) (“Justice Douglas then discussed an
array of cases that protected rights not mentioned in the Constitution. He later noted that ‘[w]ithout
those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.’ Then, in an indefensible leap in
reasoning, Douglas framed the infamous basis of contention.”).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Pope, supra note 69, at 446–47 (“In this century, numerous cases have spoken in such
amorphous terms when attempting to pinpoint exactly those rights endemic to human existence. The
Court’s attempt to clarify the inarticulable has saddled it with incomplete expressions such as,
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ ‘fundamental,’ and ‘immutable principles of justice’ as
conceived by a civilized society.’”).
73. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769–70.
74. See id. at 772. (“The Amendment, moreover, has appeared in some of the Court’s most
famous A.D.- [after Griswold] era cases, including Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, Buckley v.
Valeo, and Bowers v. Hardwick.”).
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appears to be uninterested in how and when to interpret the Ninth
Amendment. 75
C.

Interpretive Theories of the Ninth Amendment

There are many theories of constitutional interpretation that scholars,
judges, and legal professionals use to decipher the Ninth Amendment.
These approaches include: original intent theory; the textualist approach;
and theories describing the Constitution as a “living document.” 76 The
theories discussed in this Section offer some insight into how the Court
has thought about the Ninth Amendment, or how it may think about it in
the future.
1. Original Intent
Some scholars argue that the Ninth Amendment shows the Founders’
intent to recognize that other rights may exist that were not enumerated in
the Constitution. 77 According to Professor Randy Barnett, “[t]he Founders
very firmly intended that the Ninth Amendment would include
fundamental, morally based rights from their generation that should
continue to be followed by succeeding generations. In short, they
contemplated that their original intent regarding rights would be adhered
to by succeeding generations.” 78 This approach points to an interpretation
of the Ninth Amendment that emphasizes the Founders’ adherence to
natural rights and desire for those rights to be constitutionally protected,
even if unenumerated in the Constitution. 79

75. See id.
76. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 782–83.
77. See Duane L. Ostler, Rights Under the Ninth Amendment: Not Hard to Identify After All, 7
FED. CTS. L. REV. 35, 46–47 (2013) (“Jefferson favored the idea that the unchangeable laws of
nature—such as those embodied in the Ninth Amendment—controlled each generation, even if the
constitution each generation formed had expired.”). See also Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth
Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TX. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (arguing that “the way a member of
the public would today read the Ninth Amendment—before being exposed to a more ‘sophisticated’
interpretation—was also its original public meaning at the time of its enactment.”).
78. See Barnett, supra note 77, at 50.
79. See id. at 50–51 (“The Ninth Amendment is steeped in natural rights and social compact
theory. Interestingly, most scholars who discuss the Ninth Amendment agree that it was meant to
secure natural rights as understood by the founding generation . . . [but] these are points that are not
very popular today. It is more fashionable to try and change the Ninth Amendment to fit with the
times, turning the Founders’ clear meaning into something more socially acceptable in a world where
moral values have become secondary.”).
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2. The Textualist Approach
Strict textualists take the Ninth Amendment’s language at face value
and find that the Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated rights from
government intrusion. 80 Some textualist scholars invoke the
Constitution’s structure, historical context, and jurisprudential trends in
attempting to find meaning in the Ninth Amendment, but contend that
these sources should only be applied when the text of the Constitution
causes an ambiguity. 81 Critics of these scholars argue that there is no
ambiguity in the Ninth Amendment—the document itself states that there
are unenumerated rights retained by the people. 82 As one scholar noted:
The Ninth Amendment’s meaning cannot be compromised by peripheral
legal arguments. While a strong smoke screen can be established
through these positions, one need look no further than the text of the
amendment to dissipate the cloud of smoke. A brief reading of the
amendment leads to a simple and obvious conclusion—individuals
retain unenumerated rights outside the enumerated rights in the
Constitution. Unless the Ninth Amendment is repealed or altered
through a constitutional amendment, courts have a duty to give full
effect to its term. 83

For textualists, there is no need to determine what the Ninth
Amendment actually means—that meaning is clear. 84 The only question
that remains is how to determine what rights are protected by the Ninth
Amendment. 85
3. The Constitution as a Living Document
Proponents of the theory that the Constitution is a living document
see the Ninth Amendment as an open-ended clause that requires judicial
interpretation in order to discern how it applies to modern constitutional
issues. 86 To this end, the Ninth Amendment allows for the constitutional
protection of individual rights that may develop over time—i.e., rights

80. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 191–92. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill
of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. LAW REV. 1143, 1143 (“Is it even possible to deduce the spirit of a law
without looking at its letter?”).
81. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 192–93.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 194 (“The Ninth Amendment acknowledges these restrictive problems and
suggests that the Constitution is capable of adapting to societal change.”).
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that an evolving society will recognize as fundamental that the Founders
may not have contemplated. 87 Scholars who view the Constitution as a
living document ask whether asking what the Founders intended from the
Constitution makes sense in a modern context. 88
In sum, the Ninth Amendment was largely ignored in Supreme Court
jurisprudence prior to Griswold. 89 Even after Griswold, the Court’s
references to the Ninth Amendment have been minimal. 90 Legal scholars,
however, have given the amendment more attention. In doing so, scholars
have discussed various theories of interpretation to examine the Ninth
Amendment. 91 Whether the Court will follow legal scholars’ lead in
interpreting the Ninth Amendment as it relates to certain fundamental and
otherwise-protected rights such as abortion remains to be seen.
II. ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE UNDER SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence can be boiled down to
two seminal cases: Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973, and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, decided in 1992. 92 In
each of these cases, the Court found that the right to an abortion was
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Neither case discussed the implications of the Ninth Amendment on the
discussion of whether the right to an abortion was protected by the
Constitution.
A.

An Overview of the Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence Under
Substantive Due Process

The Court decided both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey under the Substantive Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 93 The Casey Court affirmed the
central holding of Roe that the abortion right was protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 94 The Ninth Amendment was only briefly cited

87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
90. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769–70.
91. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 15, at 192–93.
92. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
93. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
94. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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in Casey, when the majority opinion used it to support the assertion that
the Fourteenth Amendment should protect rights both enumerated and
unenumerated within the Constitution. 95
1. Roe v. Wade
The Court first recognized the right to obtain an abortion free from
government interference in Roe v. Wade. 96 In Roe, the Court held that a
woman’s right to an abortion was rooted in the right to privacy, which
protected the most sacred decisions regarding marriage, childrearing, and
sexual activity. 97 In holding that the right to privacy, and therefore the
right to an abortion, was protected by the Constitution, the Court
acknowledged that the document did not explicitly recognize a right to
privacy. 98 Instead, the Court held that the right to privacy was housed
within the Substantive Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 99
The Roe Court refined the rule regarding personal privacy that it set
forth in Griswold, where it recognized the right to marital privacy under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and certain
penumbras of the Bill of Rights. 100 Within the Fourteenth Amendment
context, the Court said that women had a right to obtain an abortion and
that the abortion right fell within the right of privacy. 101 The Court noted,
however, that the right was not absolute and was subject to some degree
of state regulation. 102 The Court in Roe did not address the Ninth

95. See id. at 847 (“It is . . . tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only
those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference
by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”).
96. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
97. See id. at 153 (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the
State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.”).
98. See id. at 152 (“The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy.”).
99. See id.
100. See id. (“In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co.
v. Botsford . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or
individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment . . . in
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights [in] Griswold v.
Connecticut . . . in the Ninth Amendment [in Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold]; or in the concept
of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 154 (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the

142

CONLAWNOW

[12:1

Amendment as a possible vehicle for the right of privacy or the right to an
abortion; in fact, it outright dismissed the lower court’s assertion that the
right to privacy was housed in the Ninth Amendment. 103
2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
In Casey, the Court upheld the central holding in Roe but adopted the
“undue burden” standard instead of the strict scrutiny applied in Roe. 104
The Court also discarded the trimester framework set forth in Roe. This
new rule set forth in Casey said that states may regulate abortion so long
as those regulations do not place an undue burden on women seeking
abortions prior to viability. 105 A regulation may place an undue burden on
women seeking abortions when it creates a substantial obstacle to
obtaining an abortion prior to viability. 106 The Court created this test in
order to avoid the pseudo-legislative aspect of the trimester framework set
forth in Roe. 107
The Casey Court affirmed that the right to privacy, and therefore the
right to abortion, was housed within the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 108 In placing the right to privacy and the abortion
right squarely within the Due Process Clause, the Court noted that, while
the Due Process Clause applies first and foremost to rights enumerated
within the Bill of Rights, it applies to unenumerated rights as well. 109 The
Court spent an extensive amount of time in Casey discussing the use of
the Due Process Clause to protect unenumerated rights. 110 In doing so, the
Court noted that the Due Process Clause had never been read to protect
only those rights enumerated in the Constitution. 111 Further, the Court

abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation.”).
103. See id. at 153.
104. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-467
(1992) (“After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of
institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding
of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.”).
105. See id. at 874.
106. See id. at 877.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 846 (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her
pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares that no
State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ The
controlling word in the cases before us is ‘liberty.’”).
109. See id. at 847–48.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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noted that the Constitution did not limit unenumerated rights to those that
would have been contemplated by the Founders when the Constitution
was drafted. 112
Interestingly, in its discussion of why it felt that the right to privacy
and, therefore, the abortion right, were housed under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court actually cited the Ninth Amendment. 113 The
majority opinion in Casey noted that “[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the
specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects,” and then cited the Ninth
Amendment as support. 114 The Casey Court appears to cite the Ninth
Amendment not to say that the right to privacy or the right to abortion
could be protected by the Ninth Amendment, but to acknowledge that
there are, in fact, unenumerated rights that are protected by the
Constitution. 115 In Casey, the Court cited the Ninth Amendment not as a
protector of rights in and of itself, but as an express authority for the Court
to recognize unenumerated rights as being protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 116
Furthermore, the Court noted in Casey that an analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the Court to exercise its subjective
judgement against the “deeply rooted” standard. 117 In doing so, the Court
noted that:
[T]he inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process
claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to
exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have
exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of
expression as a simple rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate
state policy choices with which we disagree; yet neither does it permit
us to shrink from the duties of our office. 118

112. See id. at 847 (“It is . . . tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only
those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference
by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”).
113. See id. at 848.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 849.
118. See id.; see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (“[T]he full scope of the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the
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Overall, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment housed the
rights to privacy and to abortion. 119 Since Casey, states have used the
undue burden standard to determine if abortion regulations violate
people’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
B.

The Lower Court’s Examinations of Abortion as a Ninth
Amendment Right: The Northern District of Texas’s Opinion in
Roe v. Wade

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, lower courts
examined several constitutional challenges to abortion regulations. 120
Interestingly, the lower court’s ruling in Roe relied heavily on the Ninth
Amendment in determining that the abortion regulation in question was
unconstitutional. 121 The Supreme Court later rejected this ruling when it
decided the case. 122
The Northern District of Texas relied on the Ninth Amendment to
find the Texas abortion laws at issue unconstitutional. 123 In doing so, the
court used Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold as the
starting point for determining whether a right was encompassed within the
Ninth Amendment. 124 The court acknowledged that the summation of
jurisprudence surrounding abortion and other rights related to
childbearing and rearing showed that there was an area of personal privacy
into which the government could not intrude. 125 The court felt that this
jurisprudence supported the assertion that the right to engage in private
conduct, such as choosing whether to have children, and therefore the
right to an abortion, was protected by the Ninth Amendment. 126
right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted
to justify their abridgment.”).
119. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 915, Stevens, J. concurring (“The woman’s constitutional liberty
interest also involves her freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy and the most personal
nature.”).
120. See Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
121. See id.
122. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
123. See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1221 (“On the merits, plaintiffs argue as their principal contention
that the Texas Abortion Laws must be declared unconstitutional because they deprive single women
and married couples of their right, secured by the Ninth Amendment, to choose whether to have
children. We agree.”).
124. See id. at 1221–22.
125. See id. at 1222.
126. See id.
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Unlike in later opinions, the Northern District of Texas saw the Ninth
Amendment as a better home for unenumerated rights than the Fourteenth
Amendment. 127 While the court acknowledged the importance of
protecting rights that “bear in a fundamental manner on the privacy of
individuals,” the court did not seem to hold that the abortion right was
fundamental only because it constituted private conduct.128 Instead, the
court seemed to acknowledge the abortion right as a freestanding right
under the Ninth Amendment. 129 After the Supreme Court rejected this
characterization of the abortion right when it decided the case in 1973,
courts have not attempted to place the abortion right under the Ninth
Amendment, and no one has challenged an abortion regulation under
Ninth Amendment grounds. 130
In sum, the Court’s landmark abortion cases, Roe and Casey,
establish a right to privacy— and therefore, a right to an abortion—within
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 131 This finding in
Roe was a departure from the Northern District of Texas’s opinion in the
same case, which found that the right to an abortion was secured by the
Ninth Amendment. 132 Since Casey, the Court has consistently recognized
the right of privacy and abortion to be found within Substantive Due
Process. 133

127. See id. See also Tom C. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 2 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 8 (1969) (“The result of these decisions is the evolution of the
concept that there is a certain zone of individual privacy which is protected by the Constitution. Unless
the State has a compelling subordinating interest that outweighs the individual rights of human beings,
it may not interfere with a person’s marriage, home, children and day-to-day living habits. This is one
of the most fundamental concepts that the Founding Fathers had in mind when they drafted the
Constitution.”).
128. See Roe, 314 F. Supp at 1221.
129. See id. at 1219. The court describes the abortion right as the right of women, “secured by
the Ninth Amendment, to choose whether to have children.” Id. While the court discusses the “zone
of individual privacy” from Griswold, the court does not acknowledge “privacy” as a freestanding
right, but as a characteristic of the conduct courts have found worthy of constitutional protection. Id.
130. See id.
131. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
132. See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1221.
133. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60–61
(acknowledging the Court’s opinion in Roe that the abortion right was housed within the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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III. RELOCATING THE ABORTION RIGHT TO THE
NINTH AMENDMENT
The Court has relied on the Fourteenth Amendment in its abortion
jurisprudence. 134 However, the Fourteenth Amendment may not be the
ideal home for this right. The Court should use the Ninth Amendment to
recognize fundamental and other protected rights, including abortion. 135
Using the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize the abortion right
unnecessarily complicates abortion jurisprudence. 136 For that reason, the
Ninth Amendment is the most appropriate home for the abortion right. 137
A.

The Ninth Amendment is Severely Underutilized in Supreme Court
Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court essentially ignored the Ninth Amendment until
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold. 138 Since Griswold, the
Court’s references to the Ninth Amendment have been sparse. 139 Many
commentators have suggested that the Court has avoided use of the Ninth
Amendment because it does not know how to effectively interpret it. 140

134. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Casey, 505 U.S. at 847.
135. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 838. .
136. See id. See also Schmidt, supra note 15, at 169–70 (“In contemporary constitutional
discussions, the analytical process generally requires sifting through a tremendous amount of material
to reach a result. The Ninth Amendment is almost the direct opposite.”).
137. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 169–70.
138. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 769.
139. See id. at 772.
140. See id. at 771 (stating that, while the Court has mentioned the Ninth Amendment in at least
twenty cases since Griswold, “the Court has never figured out exactly what to do with the curious
treasure it discovered in Griswold”). For example, Professor Kurt Lash has argued that the natural
rights theory of the Ninth Amendment is a misreading of the history of the amendment. See Kurt
Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.R. 331, 401 (2004). According
to Lash, the key to determining how to interpret the Ninth Amendment rests not on whether the
unenumerated rights “afforded to the people” are “natural rights,” but on the idea that the Ninth
Amendment affords states the right to enact certain legislation that may not be contemplated within
the Constitution itself. See id. Accordingly, Lash argues that:
Contemporary assumptions about rights and powers, however, appear to have
played an even greater role in masking the historical roots of the Ninth
Amendment. If one assumes that the Ninth Amendment is about individual
rights, while the Tenth is about government power, the state convention
precursors to the Ninth Amendment disappear from view: None of the
proposed drafts of the Ninth Amendment from the state conventions used the
language of rights. Instead, the state conventions proposed a rule of
construction limiting the interpretation of federal power. A historian who
assumes that the Ninth Amendment was about unenumerated individual rights
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Indeed, there are numerous constitutional theories to use in interpreting
the Ninth Amendment, and each can proffer a different, and often
competing, result. 141 However, criticisms that the Ninth Amendment is
difficult to interpret, and therefore an ineffective medium for recognizing
fundamental and other protected rights, are misguided. 142
There are strong arguments, textually, historically, and otherwise,
that demonstrate how to correctly use the Ninth Amendment as a tool to
protect these rights. 143 Textually, as noted by Professor Randy Barnett,
the Ninth Amendment “means what it says.” 144 The amendment clearly
expresses that there are other rights reserved to the people that are not
enumerated in the Constitution. 145 Historically, there is a great deal of
evidence that the Founders intended the Ninth Amendment to ensure that
all fundamental rights would be recognized by the courts, not just those
that were enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 146 If a reader is willing to
consider the original intent of the Founders in interpreting the Ninth

and not government power would overlook these provisions and either
erroneously focus attention on proposed amendments dealing with individual
rights or assume that there were no state precursors to the Ninth Amendment
at all.
Id. at 423. To this end, Lash’s argument rests on the idea that interpretations focusing on the natural
rights theory are an error both courts and legal scholars are guilty of making. Id.
141. See supra Part I (describing competing theories of interpretation used to interpret the Ninth
Amendment).
142. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 789.
143. See Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 231, 237 (1975) (“It seems clear from the language of the [N]inth [A]mendment
that certain rights exist even though they are not enumerated in the Constitution, that these rights are
retained by the people, and that by express command these unenumerated rights are not to be denied
or disparaged by any governmental body.”).
144. See Barnett, supra note 77, at 5 (arguing that “the way a member of the public would today
read the Ninth Amendment—before being exposed to a more ‘sophisticated’ interpretation—was also
its original public meaning at the time of its enactment.”).
145. See id.; see also Pope, supra note 69, at 448 (“On one level, the Ninth Amendment is one
of the few examples the Constitution offers indicating how the document is to be read. The command
of the amendment tells us exactly how the Constitution ‘shall not be construed.’ In fact, both the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments are ‘guides to a structural understanding of the Constitution’s enumeration
of governmental powers and personal rights, [and] guides to the actual construction of a document
which itself was plainly intended to enjoy the status of positive law.’ In addition to being a mandate
of interpretation, the Ninth Amendment seems to incorporate individual rights as well.”). But see
Lash, supra note 140, at n.14 (“In his most recent book, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Ninth
Amendment scholar Randy Barnett points out the importance of considering amendments proposed
by the states in determining the original meaning of the Constitution [citation omitted]. Barnett does
not, however, discuss any version of the Ninth Amendment proposed by the states.”).
146. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 788–89.
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Amendment, the historical context of the amendment’s passage appears
to give courts broad discretion in construing it. 147
Additionally, the Court has consistently recognized rights that are
not enumerated in the Constitution, which is essentially what the Ninth
Amendment mandates. 148 The Court is already recognizing that there are
unenumerated fundamental and other protected rights, it is just using the
more unwieldly Substantive Due Process analysis to do so. 149 The Court
should not shy away from using the Ninth Amendment because it serves
as a clear-cut way to recognize these rights. In fact, the Ninth Amendment
may be a better home for certain rights, such as the right to an abortion,
that the Court has previously housed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.

Housing Abortion Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Unnecessarily Complicates Abortion Jurisprudence

While the analysis the Court uses to determine whether a right should
be considered fundamental or otherwise protected under the Due Process
Clause is not without merit, the Court already has the express authority to
recognize unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment. 150
Furthermore, not only does the Ninth Amendment give the Court the
authority to exercise its judgment as to what constitutes a protected right,
it also serves as in independent source of rights. 151 As one scholar noted,
“[t]he Ninth Amendment is an authoritative source guaranteeing the zone
of privacy, not a persuasive source supporting the constitutional
recognition of a zone of privacy through a provision of another
amendment” as the Court did in Roe. 152 Indeed:
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–
47 (1992).
149. See id.; see also Schmidt, supra note 15, at 169–70.
150. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 170 (“The plain meaning of the amendment sanctions its
authority to adjudicate whether an unenumerated right exists warranting constitutional recognition.
This contradicts current jurisprudence adopting a substantive due process component in the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
151. See id. at 179.
152. See id. at 177. For example, in Griswold:
The Court does not explain or state anything else in reference to the Ninth
Amendment. Its text is left dangling before the curious reader’s eyes as though
awaiting some explanation. The reason no explanation exists is because the
Court cannot give one. It cannot explain how the Ninth Amendment can
support recognizing a zone of privacy under the liberty component of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the text and meaning of the Ninth Amendment
precludes that conclusion. The specific guarantee under the Ninth Amendment
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A Ninth Amendment-only jurisprudence to determine whether an
unenumerated right exists follows the Constitution’s text . . . .This
entirely text-based apparatus streamlines the jurisprudence through a
credible constitutional foundation that eliminates the ability of judges to
inaccurately alter the issue before them to reach a legal result that does
not conform to constitutional language. 153

Using the Ninth Amendment, as opposed to the Fourteenth
Amendment, to house certain rights related to privacy provides a
streamlined approach to determining which rights are constitutionally
protected. 154 A more streamlined approach to determining what
constitutes a fundamental or other protected right is necessary in order to
ensure that those rights extended protection are those that ensure the
greatest protection of private rights to the people, and not simply those
that are politicized for being “moral” or “immoral.” This method would
remove certain rights, such as the right to an abortion, outside the realm
of complicated Substantive Due Process jurisprudence.
C.

The Ninth Amendment is the Best Place Within the Constitution to
House the Abortion Right

The Ninth Amendment expressly acknowledges the Court’s
authority to recognize unenumerated fundamental and otherwiseprotected rights, and the right to abortion is one of those rights. 155 The
recognition of a woman’s right to an abortion is consistent with other
unenumerated rights the Court has recognized, from the use of
contraception to the right to procreation. 156 There is no need to go through
a complicated Substantive Due Process analysis to recognize the abortion
right. 157 The Ninth Amendment already allows for the recognition of

is that the people retain unenumerated rights. Therefore, the Ninth Amendment
recognizes the zone of privacy that encompasses a marital couple’s choice to
use contraceptive devices.
Id. at 175.
153. See id. at 178–79.
154. See id.
155. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 788–89.
156. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
157. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 185 (“The topsy-turvy nature of recent substantive due
process methodology seems to conform to the result needed, depending upon which ideological block
forms a majority. It has become based on more tradition and history, thereby, limiting the recognition
of rights, while still expanding to contain more flexible and evolving principles when recognizing the
existence of a fundamental right. These inconsistent analytical means undoubtedly promote the
possibility of judicial legislation due to substantive due process’s lack of a textual origin.”)
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unenumerated, fundamental or otherwise-protected, rights that are
“retained by the people.” 158
Using the Ninth Amendment to recognize the right to an abortion is
a better path than using the Fourteenth Amendment because it takes the
determination of whether an abortion is a protected right outside the moral
realm. 159 The analysis of whether a right is “deeply rooted in the tradition”
of the United States inevitably stirs a debate about whether the public
considers abortion morally acceptable. 160 In recognizing the right to an
abortion under the Ninth Amendment, no such analysis is necessary. 161
The text of the Ninth Amendment allows the Court to recognize this
protected right without an inquiry into whether it is deeply rooted in
historical tradition. 162 Instead, the Court can simply recognize that the
right involves private conduct, which it has consistently recognized is
worthy of constitutional protection, and acknowledge that the Ninth
Amendment affords this right to the people. 163 This technique would
ensure that a controversial and politicized right such as abortion would
not be exempted from constitutional protections just because reasonable
minds could differ as to whether an act is deeply rooted enough in our
collective consciousness.
From this perspective, the Court does not necessarily need to
recognize a stand-alone right to privacy in order to recognize the right to
an abortion. 164 Under the Ninth Amendment, the abortion right can be
recognized as fundamental or otherwise protected in and of itself. 165
Instead of recognizing a protected right to privacy that encompasses the
right to an abortion, the Court could choose to affirmatively recognize the
right to an abortion that is protected because it involves objectively private

158. See id.
159. See id. at 189–90.
160. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (stating that the Due Process
Clause affords only those protections “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.”). See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (stating that the Court’s
jurisprudence reflects “continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.”).
161. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 232 (“An objective reading of the Ninth Amendment should
lead to an almost universal conclusion - unenumerated rights exist outside those enumerated in the
Constitution. But it is amazing how the legal community creates complex issues. Instead of following
the Ninth Amendment’s text, the United States Supreme Court created the substantive due process
tall-tale, and it continues to this day.”).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 175.
164. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
165. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1221-22 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
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conduct. 166 To this end, the Northern District of Texas was correct in
holding that the abortion right was housed under the Ninth Amendment. 167
The court correctly acknowledged that abortion can be a stand-alone right
under the Ninth Amendment. 168 Furthermore, the court acknowledged
that the summation of jurisprudence surrounding abortion and other rights
related to childbearing showed that there was a zone of privacy into which
the government could not intrude. 169 Unlike in other later opinions, the
Northern District of Texas saw these rights as being protected under the
Ninth Amendment. 170 The Supreme Court’s departure from this reasoning
in its decision in Roe was an error.
As a practical matter, it may be less cumbersome for the Court to
continue to recognize a right of privacy encompassed by the Ninth
Amendment and acknowledge that, as objectively private conduct,
abortion should be considered a right protected by the Ninth
Amendment. 171 For that reason, the standard the court should use to
determine if certain conduct is worthy of constitutional protection should
be whether the conduct falls within the realm of natural rights. 172 Natural
rights theory is based on the principle that neither individuals nor
government can take action that would cause harm to another citizen’s
life, property, health, liberty, or possessions.173 In turn, citizens must
voluntarily engage in a social compact to give up certain rights in order to
ensure that the state can protect other rights and run efficiently. 174 Under
this understanding of natural rights theory, the right to an abortion is
clearly a right that should be afforded constitutional protection. The
decision of whether to have an abortion implicates the personal liberty of
pregnant people. It can also implicate health and life in cases where
carrying the pregnancy to term may threaten it. Allowing the government
to regulate private conduct affecting health, life and liberty would run
afoul of natural rights theory. Indeed, all of these values are those
contemplated by natural rights theory, and are therefore appropriate to
afford constitutional protection.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1222.
See id.; see also Clark, supra note 127, at 8.
See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1222.
See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 207.
See LOCKE, supra note 30, at 8.
See id.
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Furthermore, an interpretation of the Ninth Amendment that allows
for the constitutional protection of rights within the natural rights umbrella
is consistent with several competing theories of interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment. 175 Using natural rights theory as the measuring stick for
what constitutes an unenumerated right is consistent with a historical
understanding of the Ninth Amendment, which was steeped in natural
rights theory. 176 However, it also allows for the flexibility to protect
natural rights that may not have been contemplated by the Founders but
are still important to the ethical and efficient functioning of modern
society. 177 While it is unlikely that the Founders thought about the right
to an abortion when enacting the Ninth Amendment—or any other issue
related women’s sexuality or autonomy, for that matter—the overall
concept of natural Rights allows for the Court to protect those rights that
fall under this relatively broad umbrella. To this end, the Court can
determine whether the conduct is within the same or similar character of
other natural rights—rights that involve personal liberty, autonomy,
privacy, life or health—and extend constitutional protection accordingly.
Opponents of abortion criticize the idea that abortion could be
protected by the Ninth Amendment or considered a natural right. 178 As
one scholar argues, under both natural rights theory and other
philosophical mechanisms such as the harm principle, abortion is contrary
to the law of nature because it involves the taking of life.179 Accordingly,
he argues that:
[F]or the Founders if there was a conflict between a man-made law and
the laws of nature, the latter should prevail. Simply put, whatever the
common law had to say about abortion is significantly subordinate to
natural law. To say that the common law should prevail in respect to
abortion is to elevate the trivial over the essential. 180

175. See Barnett, supra note 77, at 2 (“The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to ensure that
all individual natural rights had the same stature and force after some of them were enumerated as
they had before; and its existence argued against a latitudinarian interpretation of federal powers.”).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Ostler, supra note 77, at 75.
179. See id. (“Hence, natural law writers Burlamaqui, Grotius, and Pufendorf—who were
heavily relied on by the Founders—were in agreement that abortion at any stage of pregnancy was
contrary to the law of nature, and that the unborn should be protected from the moment of
conception.”).
180. See id. at 77.
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This argument is similar to other anti-abortion arguments that
abortion is sui generis and different from other rights that implicate
privacy because it involves the taking of life. 181
This argument does not hold up to careful scrutiny, however, because
the very essence of natural rights theory actually allows for the protection
of abortion, despite the fact that it acts upon a fetus. 182 Imposing state
control on the decision whether to have an abortion would amount to an
infringement upon the liberty of the pregnant person, which would
arguably be contrary to natural law. Furthermore, the prohibition of
abortion would, in many circumstances, directly affect the health or life
of pregnant women, which would also go against natural law principles. 183
Natural law principles do not have to stand for the proposition that unborn
life must be preserved in spite of the liberty of pregnant women, whose
autonomy was likely not contemplated by the Founders or philosophers
the Founders admired. 184 An interpretation of natural law theory that takes
into account its historical importance but also recognizes its place in a
modern context can serve as a mechanism to protect the abortion right
under the Ninth Amendment.
In sum, the Court should use the Ninth Amendment to recognize
fundamental and other-protected rights, including that of abortion.185
Using the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize the abortion right
unnecessarily complicates abortion jurisprudence, and rights that fall
under the natural rights umbrella can be effectively protected by the Ninth
Amendment. 186 The Ninth Amendment is the most appropriate home for
the abortion right. 187

181. See id.; see also Mattei Ion Radu, Incompatible Theories: Natural Law and Substantive
Due Process, 54 VIL. L. REV. 247, 276 (“Consequently, abortion is never morally acceptable if the
being destroyed by the act is in fact an innocent human person. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to answer fully that extremely important moral question. It is enough to point out that an
overwhelming majority of current natural law thinkers agree that abortion is the killing of an innocent
human person and is therefore illicit.”).
182. See The Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt Oral Argument: A Roundtable Discussion
with Members of NYU Law Students for Reproductive Justice, 41 HARBINGER 155, 163 (2016).
183. See id. at 157.
184. See Sanders, supra note 5, at 788–89.
185. See id.
186. See id.; see also Schmidt, supra note 15, at 169–70.
187. See Schmidt, supra note 15, at 105.
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CONCLUSION
The Ninth Amendment expressly grants the Supreme Court authority
to recognize fundamental and other-protected rights that, while not found
within the text of the constitution, are “retained by the people.” 188 Despite
this grant of authority, the Court has been reluctant to use or interpret the
Ninth Amendment. Instead, the Court has relied on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to house protected rights related to
privacy, as well as a free-standing right to privacy itself. The analysis of
whether a right should be afforded constitutional protection under the
Substantive Due Process Clause requires the Court to engage in a
cumbersome analysis of whether a right is deeply rooted in our nation’s
tradition. This analysis inevitably requires the Court to wade into the
murky waters of whether a right is considered moral by the American
public.
To this end, the Court’s findings in Roe and Casey that the right to
an abortion is encompassed by a right of privacy that is housed within the
Fourteenth Amendment are erroneous. The Ninth Amendment is the more
appropriate home for the abortion right. Under the Ninth Amendment, the
abortion right can be recognized as a protected right in and of itself.
Indeed, the Court can use natural law principles, as contemplated by the
Founders, to recognize that private conduct is worthy of constitutional
protection and acknowledge that the Ninth Amendment affords these
rights to the people. Using this analysis would ensure that the most
important of our natural rights, including the right to an abortion, are
afforded constitutional protection.

188.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.

